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CORPORATE INCOME TAX1
A.

Legislation
1.

Single Sales Factor. Virginia adopts single sales factor apportionment for
retail merchants and Manufacturers, but does so in very different ways.
Both methods phase in the effects of SSF between 2012 and July 1, 2015.
Retail Merchants. Virginia Code § 58.1-408 provides for
mandatory SSF by “retail companies” which is defined by
reference to Sectors 44 - 45 of the NAICS.
Manufacturers. The use of SSF by manufacturers continues to be
optional. Any manufacturer who elects SSF must maintain its
employment levels at 90% of the year preceding the election and
pay its workers more than the average weekly wage of the
industry. Failure to meet both standards results in a claw back of
tax benefits, with interest but without penalty.

2.
B.

Cases
1.

1

Conformity. Virginia’s conformity with federal law is advanced to
December 31, 2011.

Albert J. Starnes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2011-63 (2011), aff’d
Starnes v. Commissioner, 680 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2012). Tarcon, a North
Carolina business, had discontinued most of its operations and sold its real
estate generating tax gains inside the corporation. At this point, Tarcon
held only cash. It was solicited to sell the company’s stock for an amount

The summaries in this outline are intended to alert the read to certain developments in Virginia
law. Not all developments are reviewed. Readers should refer to the actual legislation, ruling, etc. for a
complete and correct understanding of the development.

equal to a percent of its cash. The net result was more after tax cash to the
shareholders than if they had liquidated Tarcon, paying the corporate tax,
and then paying tax on the liquidation. Unknown to the former
shareholders, the new owners of Tarcon engaged in an abusive tax shelter
transaction that generated fictitious losses to offset the gains from the sale
of Tarcon’s real estate. Based on its position in IRS Notice 2001-16,
2001-1 C.B. 730, the IRS recharacterized the transaction as a liquidation
of Tarcon followed by distributions to its shareholders resulting in
substantial tax, interest, and penalties owed by Tarcon which no longer
existed. When the new owners of Tarcon failed to pay Tarcon’s tax
liabilities, the IRS asserted the tax against the former shareholders under a
transferee liability theory. Judge Cohen for the Tax Court held for the
taxpayers that they could not be held responsible as transferees.
Following Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U. S. 39 (1958), Judge Cohen held
that transferee liability must be determined under state law. By her
analysis, there was no transferee liability under North Carolina law
because the shareholders lacked any knowledge of the purchasers’ tax
shelter plans. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the IRS’ position is that it
can look to federal law to recharacterize the transaction and apply that
recast of the facts to obtain transferee liability under state law.
In a series of cases involving similar fact patterns to Starnes, the IRS has
lost all but one of the cases it has brought against former shareholders in
the Tax Court. In general, the result in those cases turned on whether the
former shareholders had knowledge of the buyer’s tax abuse. Salus Mundi
Foundation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo. 2012-61
(IRS did not prove shareholders had knowledge of buyer’s plans;
transferee liability not imposed); Slone v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-57
(same); Frank Sawyer Trust of May 1992 v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, T.C. Memo. 2011-298 (same); Feldman v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo. 2011-297 (shareholders knew about
buyer’s plans; transferee liability imposed); Shockley v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo. 2011-63 (IRS did not issue transferee
notice within statute of limitations; transferee liability not imposed);
Griffin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo. 2011-61 (Tax
Court determines transaction cannot be recast as an asset sale followed by
distribution under federal income tax principles; transferee liability not
imposed); Diebold v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo.
2010-238 (Tax Court determines IRS pursued wrong taxpayer; transferee
liability not imposed); LR Dev. Co., LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2010-203 (IRS did not prove elements for imposing transferee liability
under state law; transferee liability not imposed).
2.

Wendy’s International Inc. v. Virginia Department of Taxation, Cir. Ct.
City of Richmond Case No. CL 09-3757 (March 29, 2012), petition for
appeal filed. Certain trademarks and other intangibles were licensed by
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Oldemark LLC, a related entity, to Wendy’s International for a royalty
equal to 3% of gross revenues. Wendy’s, in turn, licensed its own
intangibles and sublicensed the Oldemark intangibles for a total royalty of
4%. Approximately two-thirds of the royalties received by Wendy’s
International were from unrelated franchisees. Department of Taxation
argued that the “safe harbor” applicable when an intangible holding
company “derives” more than one-third of its revenues from unrelated
parties and licenses those intangibles to related parties on the same terms,
did not apply. According to the Department, only direct licensing
arrangements were covered by the safe harbor. The trial court disagreed
with the Department, holding that the statute was clear and unambiguous
in providing a safe harbor when more than one-third of royalties “derived”
from unrelated parties. The term “derived” does not connote any direct
licensing relationship.
C.

Rulings of the State Tax Commissioner
1.

Nexus/Factors. PD 11-139 (August 2, 2011). Out-of-state engineering
firm was erroneously included in the Virginia consolidated return of the
affiliated group. Engineering firm had no property or sales in Virginia.
Its only payroll was two Virginia employees who worked at the
company’s office in another state. Because the taxpayer had no factors in
Virginia, it had no nexus with Virginia.

2.

Virginia Corporation/Nexus. PD 11-199 (December 9, 2011). Even
though incorporated under Virginia law and therefore required to file a
Virginia return, a corporation is not subject to Virginia income tax unless
it has nexus with Virginia. This requires positive apportionment factors.
Subsidiaries in question may have had connections with Virginia, but they
did not have positive apportionment factors and therefore did not have
nexus. They could not be included in the consolidated Virginia return.

3.

Nexus/Internet Servers. PD 12-36 (March 28, 2012). Corporation had
salesmen in Virginia soliciting sales of Internet services which were
provided from out of state except for the presence in Virginia of servers to
which the corporation had no physical access. Commissioner holds that
presence of servers exceeds protection provided by PL 86-272. Following
the General Motors case, income from services can be apportioned based
on either total costs or direct costs only (per regulation). If the greater
proportion of services are performed outside Virginia, then none of the
sales produced by those services is apportionable to Virginia.

4.

Virginia Source Income. PD 12-138 (August 28, 2012). Law firm had an
administrative office in Virginia, but all of its lawyers were located in an
adjoining state and were authorized to practice only in that state.
Commissioner holds that this S corp does have income from Virginia
sources based on the fact that it has both property and payroll here.
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Whether it has sales taxable in Virginia will depend upon the predominate
location of the costs of performance.
5.

Destination Sales. PD 12-142 (August 29, 2012). Manufacturer with its
sole plant and headquarters in Virginia could nevertheless apportion sales
if it could establish that its activities in a foreign country in installing
goods it sells would exceed the protections of PL 86-272. If the seller
knew that the ultimate destination of the property it was shipping was
outside Virginia, it was not a Virginia sale. By contrast, if the equipment
was held in a Virginia warehouse, with shipping directed and controlled
by the purchaser, this would be deemed a Virginia sale, not an out of state
sale.

6.

Construction Contract Apportionment. PD 12-47 (April 23, 2012).
Contractor, which apportioned using the three-factor method, performed
contracts in Maryland using Virginia based employees. In determining
“costs of performance” for purposes of the sales factor, taxpayer must
determine if direct costs associated with contracts performed outside of
Virginia exceed such costs incurred within Virginia. Although the
Department generally looks to whether wages are reported to the VEC as
controlling whether those wages are in the Virginia numerator, because of
the reciprocity between Maryland and Virginia, tax payer can demonstrate
the wages actually paid to workers outside Virginia.

7.

PL 86-272/Withholding. PD 12-37 (March 30, 2012). Even though a
company may be exempt from Virginia income tax by virtue of PL 86272, it still must withhold income taxes from its employees (e.g.,
salesmen) who work in Virginia.

8.

Out of State Withholding. PD 12-75 (May 9, 2012). An out of state
employer is required to withhold Virginia income taxes even from nonresident employees who earn income from Virginia sources. Estimation
method used by auditor did not produce a materially different result than
the taxpayer’s alternative proposal.

9.

§ 199 Deduction/Separate Return. PD 11-181 (November 1, 2011).
Auditor improperly disallowed taxpayer’s IRC § 199 deduction. Even
though taxpayer filed a federal consolidated return and a separate Virginia
return, it was entitled to its proportional share of the IRC § 199 deduction
on its separate Virginia return.

10.

IHC/Business Purpose. PD 11-162 (September 26, 2011). Intangible
holding company could not be included in combined return, thereby
allowing expenses to offset added back income items because IHC did not
have nexus with Virginia. Commissioner would not consider in the
context of an audit appeal taxpayer’s argument that there were valid
business purposes for its factoring arrangements. Taxpayer required to
follow the specific statutory procedure to make that argument.
-4-

II.

11.

IHC/Factoring Fees. PD 11-174 (October 12, 2011). The definition of
“intangible expenses and cost” specifically includes factoring fees which
are required to be added back by § 58.1-402B8(a). A bankruptcy remote
entity may have a valid business purpose if it facilitates the securitization
of receivables and is required by unrelated third-party lenders. In order to
advance this position, the taxpayer must follow the specific procedures
which require it to pay the tax and file an amended return claiming a
refund.

12.

Telecom Coop. PD 12-14 (March 2, 2012). Telecommunications
cooperative was exempt from both Virginia income tax and minimum tax
even in years in which it failed to meet the 85% test under IRC
§ 501(c)(12). Commissioner holds, however, that it is nevertheless
taxable on its UBTI. Income of its telecommunications subsidiary
included in its consolidated federal filing is subject to tax.

13.

Conformity/QFT. PD 12-38 (April 4, 2012); PD 12-39 (April 6, 2012).
Although taxed at the lowest rate for federal income tax purposes, a
qualified funeral trust does not receive that rate benefit under Virginia law.
Virginia conforms based on federal adjusted gross income, not tax rates.

14.

Consolidated to Separate Filing. PD 12-91 (June 5, 2012). When
corporations for affiliates were converted from corporate form to single
member LLCs, it was no longer an affiliated group for Virginia income
tax purposes. Therefore, the parent corporation is required to file a
separate Virginia return and does not need permission to change from
consolidated to separate return filing.

TAX CREDITS
A.

Legislation
1.

B.

Historic Tax Credits. Virginia deconforms to the income tax result
reached by the Fourth Circuit in the Virginia Historic case. Gain or
income recognized under federal law with respect to historic tax credits is
not treated as taxable gain for Virginia income tax purposes.

Cases
Virginia Historic Tax Credit Fund 2001 LP, et al, v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 639 F.3d 129 (4th Cir. 2011), revg. T.C. Memo. 2009-295. Overruling
the US Tax Court, the Fourth Circuit holds that limited partners’ contributions to
the capital of a partnership in exchange for the allocation of Virginia historic
rehabilitation tax credits was a “disguised sale” under IRC § 707. As a
consequence, the partnership recognized gain, which passed through to its general
partners, when tax credits purchased from developers were sold to investors at a
substantial profit. The Commonwealth of Virginia filed an amicus curiae brief
supporting the taxpayers and defending the traditional method by which
-5-

Virginia’s historic rehabilitation credits are transferred to investors. The key to
the Fourth Circuit’s holding was its conclusion that tax credits are “property” and
not merely an allocation made within the confines of a partnership agreement.
This issue had not been briefed or decided by the Tax Court. Rather, the IRS and
the Tax Court focused on whether the limited partners were partners under the
traditional partnership test. See Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 136 T.C. 1 (2011), on appeal to the Third Circuit at case
number 11-1832, involving the same disguised sale argument with respect to
federal income tax credits.
C.

Rulings of the State Tax Commissioner
1.

Land Preservation Credits. PD 11-154 (August 30, 2011); PD 11-155
(August 30, 2011). The issue was the value of a conservation easement.
When the Department appraisal varied substantially from the taxpayer’s
appraisal, the Department engaged two different third party appraisals.
The difference was primarily in the “before value.” The taxpayer’s
“before value” was $22,300 per acre which compared to a purchase price
two years earlier of $2,850 per acre. The Department’s “before value”
was $12.3 million. The third party appraiser’s “before value” was
$8.275 million.
Valuation Approach. The Department ultimately accepts the third party
appraisal which was based on a comparable sales approach, with
adjustments. The taxpayer’s use of a “discounted cash flow method” was
rejected.
Statute of Limitations. Although the Department has the authority under
the statutes to increase the assessment as part of the appeal process, the
Commissioner states: “The Department’s policy has been to make such
assessments only if the statute of limitations for otherwise making an
assessment has not expired.” No tax in addition to the audit assessment
was asserted.
Observation: Taxpayers who value properties using a “development
approach” based on number of lots, assumed time to sell, value per lot,
assumed interest rate, etc. will invariably find “push back” from the tax
authorities. It is interesting, however, that many real estate professionals
assert that this is exactly how the marketplace would value a property of
this sort. Note, however, that the way the Commissioner did not assert his
right to assess additional tax may give the taxpayer something to think
about before he files suit because the trial court also has the power to
increase the assessment.
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III.

INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
A.

B.

Legislation
1.

Credit for State Taxes. Virginia Code § 58.1-332.2 now provides a
definition of “income tax” with the stated intent to make clear that the DC
Unincorporated Business Franchise Tax, Texas Margin Tax, and Ohio
Commercial Activity Tax do not qualify for purposes of the individual
income tax credit allowed Virginia residents. The bill is retroactive to
2007. The bill purports to confirm long-standing Virginia income tax
policy.

2.

Debit Cards/Refunds. Effective January 1, 2013, the 2012 - 2014
Appropriations Act requires that all individual refunds be by debit cards,
not checks. Estimated to save Commonwealth $200,000 annually.

Rulings of the State Tax Commissioner
1.

Virginia Residents. The following rulings all deal with who is a
domiciliary or resident of Virginia: PD 11-171 (September 30, 2011); PD
11-165 (September 27, 2011); PD 12-26 (March 15, 2012); PD 12-8
(February 23, 2012); PD 12-11 (February 27, 2012) (service member’s
spouse); PD 12-16 (March 5, 2012) (service member’s spouse);
PD 1230 (March 22, 2012); PD 12-86 (May 24, 2012); PD 12-99 (June 15,
2012); PD 12-112 (July 16, 2012); PD 12-113 (July 17, 2012); PD 12-136
(August 20, 2012); PD 12-140 (August 29, 2012); PD 12-115 (July 19,
2012).

2.

Actual Resident/Part-Year Return. PD 11-177 (October 24, 2011).
Because taxpayer spent more than 183 days in Virginia they were actual
residents (even though wife’s medical condition caused them to stay that
long). But because they were actual residents for part of the year, they
were entitled to file part-year return.

3.

Service Member Residence. PD 11-158 (September 16, 2011). Spouse
and her service member husband did not share the same state of domicile
before being transferred to Virginia. They took steps to change their
domicile to a new state, but the service member was never physically
present in that state so he could not have been deemed to have established
a domicile there. Since service member and wife did not have the same
domicile, she does not qualify for a refund of Virginia tax based on the
Service Member Civil Relief Act.

4.

Service Member Spouse. PD 12-59 (April 27, 2012). A spouse can
neither lose or acquire domicile or residence in a state when the spouse is
present there solely to be with a service member spouse stationed there.
On the other hand, the spouse can independently establish a domicile in
Virginia. Spouse held to have a Virginia domicile in Virginia based on
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establishment of a permanent place of abode, obtaining regular
employment in Virginia and obtaining a Virginia drivers license which
requires a statement of residence in Virginia.
5.

Service Member Spouse. PD 12-120 (July 26, 2012). Department
generally does not seek to tax a service member’s spouse who maintains
sufficient connections with another state to indicate intent to maintain their
domicile there. These indicia would include a State of Legal Residence
Certificate (DD Form 2058), drivers license, voter registration, automobile
registration. In this case, the spouse had a permanent home in Virginia, a
Virginia drivers license and Virginia registered motor vehicles, and
registered to vote in a state where she had never physically resided. Held
to be Virginia resident.

6.

National Guard Pay. PD 12-25 (March 14, 2012). When one spouse is a
Virginia resident and another spouses is a nonresident, deductions and
exemptions are prorated between the spouses based on their relative FAGI
absent proof to the contrary. Compensation for serving in the National
Guard of another state is nevertheless taxable by Virginia, but subject to a
credit for any taxes paid the other state. Only compensation from the
Virginia National Guard is deductible.

7.

Age Deduction. PD 12-56 (April 26, 2012). For purposes of determining
a taxpayer’s adjusted gross income and the amount of any age deduction, a
taxpayer is not allowed to exclude unemployment benefits. This
deduction is already reflected in arriving at federal adjusted gross income.

8.

Disability/Retirement Income. PD 12-20 (March 5, 2012). Disability
payments are payments made in lieu of wages. When one’s status
converts to “retired,” payments previously made as disability payments are
retirement payments and no longer deductible for Virginia income tax
purposes.

9.

Disability. PD 11-179 (October 25, 2011). Disability payments received
as a result of military service are not includable in federal adjusted gross
income. Therefore, they are not deductible from Virginia taxable income.

10.

Disability Income. PD 12-134 (August 20, 2012). Amount of a DC
fireman’s pension was already deducted on federal return. No double
deduction then allowed on the Virginia return.

11.

Disability Income. PD 12-134 (August 20, 2012). Amount of a DC
fireman’s pension was already deducted on federal return. No double
deduction then allowed on the Virginia return.

12.

Death Benefits. PD 12-76 (May 9, 2012). Taxpayer notes that statute in
effect in 2008 and 2009 did not require a death benefit to be paid in a lump
sum in order to be excludable from Virginia taxable income.
-8-

Commissioner rules, however, that previous determinations contained the
lump sum requirement and amendments to Virginia Code § 58.1-322C(32)
in the 2012 Session “confirmed” the Department’s interpretation.
13.

IRA. PD 12-83 (May 16, 2012). There is no provision in Virginia law
allowing a subtraction from Virginia taxable income for an inherited IRA.
If the distribution is included in federal adjusted gross income, it is part of
Virginia taxable income.

14.

Itemized Deductions/Proof. PD 11-197 (December 6, 2011). Itemized
deductions are allocated between resident and nonresident spouse based
on relative federal adjusted gross incomes unless taxpayer can show that
itemized deductions were paid by him. In this case, husband could not
show that funds transferred to the “Virginia account” were not spouse’s
funds. Thus, he was unable to prove that his income alone was used to
pay the itemized deductions.

15.

Nonresident Spouse/Allocated Deductions. PD 12-94 (June 11, 2012).
Auditor disallowed all itemized deductions on Virginia spouse’s return
because all those items had been claimed on his spouse’s return in another
state. Commissioner disagrees, holding that a proportional part of the
itemized deductions should be allowed in Virginia based on the spouses’
relative adjusted gross incomes.

16.

Mortgage Deduction/Motor Home. PD 12-42 (April 12, 2012). Because
the motor home had a sleeping space, kitchen and toilet, the
Commissioner concludes that it can be treated as a “qualified residence”
for which mortgage interest in deductible.

17.

Burden of Proof. PD 12-15 (March 2, 2012). Taxpayers proved that they
filed their federal returns, but were unable to produce proof that they filed
a Virginia return.

18.

Burden of Proof. PD 12-33 (March 26, 2012). Adjustments were made to
assessment based on information provided (late) by the taxpayer.

19.

Conformity/Deductions. PD 12-132 (August 10, 2012). Taxpayer’s
business and non-business expenses were commingled. As a result,
taxpayer was unable to establish with certainty deductions claimed on its
federal return and auditor estimated deductions using industry average
pricing. Auditor’s actions upheld.

20.

Timing/Annuity Surrender. PD 12-109 (July 3, 2012). Taxpayer
borrowed money from an annuity while a resident of another state, but
surrendered the annuity without repaying the loan when a resident of
Virginia. The taxable event was the surrender of the annuity, and that
occurred when taxpayer resided in Virginia.
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21.

Naked Assessment. PD 12-53 (April 24, 2012). When taxpayer refused
to file a Virginia return, Department made an estimated assessment based
on information provided by IRS. This is sufficient, and it is taxpayer’s
burden to show that it is wrong.

22.

Federal Audits/SOL. PD 12-3 (January 19, 2012). When taxpayer fails to
report federal adjustments, the Department can make an assessment
without regard to any statute of limitations. Taxpayer has 90 days to
appeal. The Department will not look behind federal adjustments.

23.

IRS Adjustments/SOL. PD 12-40 (April 6, 2012). Department made an
audit assessment based on information from the IRS. When the IRS then
withdrew its audit adjustments, the Department’s assessment was
effectively barred by the statute of limitations because the Department’s
assessment had been made more than three years after the original return
was filed.

24.

Federal Audit. PD 11-169 (September 29, 2011). Taxpayer who did not
advise the Department of changes to his federal return cannot contest
those changes. The Department will not look behind the federal audit.

25.

Federal Audit. PD 12-82 (May 4, 2012). When a taxpayer is undergoing
a disputed audit with the IRS, the proper way to handle the corresponding
Virginia tax is to file an amended return when the federal audit is
concluded.

26.

IRS Information. PD 12-121 (July 26, 2012). Virginia is entitled to rely
on information received from the IRS. It has a valid information sharing
agreement, and such information is not illegally obtained. Taxpayer has
provided no proof that the information on which the jeopardy assessment
was based is wrong.

27.

IRS Information. PD 12-117 (July 20, 2012). Taxpayer failed to provide
any information showing that the tax information received from the IRS
was incorrect.

28.

Professional Return Preparer. PD 12-93 (June 8, 2012). Taxpayer failed to
provide documentation supporting deductions upon request by the
Department. Although taxpayer reasonably relied on a professional to
prepare the tax return, that does not relieve the taxpayer of the obligation
to substantiate deductions taken on the return.

29.

Out-of-State Income. PD 12-17 (March 5, 2012). Income earned by a
Virginia resident in New York is still taxable by Virginia, subject to a
credit for New York taxes paid. The ruling discusses how to compute the
credit.
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30.

Out-of-State Tax Credits. PD 12-7 (February 23, 2012). Virginia
considers a tax credit to be a reduction of liability and not an actual
payment of tax. Thus, when a tax credit is used to pay one’s liability in
another state, that is not considered to be a payment of tax to that state for
purposes of calculating Virginia’s credit for taxes paid on income to other
states.

31.

Out-of-State Credit. PD 11-159 (September 19, 2011). Taxpayer, a
Virginia resident, failed to file Virginia returns but did pay tax on the
income she earned in another state. Virginia will allow a credit for those
taxes, but the taxpayer must provide Virginia returns in order to obtain
that credit.

32.

NATO Income. PD 12-29 (March 21, 2012). Payments made by the US
to individuals working in a foreign country remain taxable by Virginia.
Nevertheless, under the Ottawa Agreement, payments by NATO for
services overseas are not subject to federal income taxation or Virginia
taxation.

33.

Foreign Tax Credit. PD 12-124 (July 31, 2012). Taxpayer recognized
gain on the sale of property located in another country. Virginia no longer
permits a deduction for foreign source income. Taxpayer failed to prove
that tax treaty between US and the other country required a foreign tax
credit on US returns.

34.

Foreign Tax Credit. PD 12-110 (July 3, 2012). Income received from
mutual funds and other investments which results in a foreign income tax
is not income tax paid on a pension or retirement income, and therefore no
credit is allowed.

35.

Reciprocity. PD 12-105 (June 19, 2012). Virginia resident worked in
Virginia and also Maryland and West Virginia. Employer withheld wages
for all three states. Taxpayer was not entitled to claim a credit for the
West Virginia and Maryland taxes because, by agreement with those
states, only Virginia taxes should have been paid. Taxpayer should claim
refund from West Virginia and Maryland.

36.

Reciprocity/Statute of Limitations. PD 12-104 (June 19, 2012). Maryland
resident incorrectly had Virginia income tax withheld from his wages and
filed a nonresident Virginia income tax returns. When Maryland audited,
taxpayer filed amended Virginia returns for years under Maryland audit.
Although the regular statute of limitations had expired, the taxpayers did
file amended return within the one year period allowed “from the final
determination of a change made by any other state.”

37.

Statute of Limitations. PD 11-202 (December 13, 2011). Taxpayer failed
to file return within the extended due date. That extension then “expires”
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and any amendment of the return for that year must be filed within three
years of the original due date.
38.

SOL/Refunds. PD 12-114 (July 19, 2012). Claims for refund must be
filed within three years of the due date of the original return.

39.

SOL/Setoff. PD 12-126 (July 31, 2012). Taxpayer was asked to file a
return for 2007 and responded with unfiled returns for 2004 - 2009,
seeking to offset the 2007 liability with the earlier overpayments.
Taxpayer’s claim with respect to the earlier years was barred by the statute
of limitations. No setoff and no waiver of penalty allowed. Interest is not
waived because it is a fee for the use of money.

40.

SOL/Assessment. PD 12-135 (August 20, 2012). The payment of tax
upon the recordation of a deed is a self-assessment. Any claim for refund
must be filed within 3 years of the date of that assessment.

41.

SOL/Appeals. PD 12-139 (August 28, 2012). Appeals must be filed
within 90 days. Requests for reconsideration within 45 days of the
contested determination.

42.

Statute of Limitations. PD 11-178 (October 25, 2011). Taxpayer was
assessed based on information from the IRS. When taxpayer did not
provide information or responses to the Department’s inquiries, and no
appeal was filed within 90 days, taxpayer’s rights to protest
administratively expired.

43.

SOL/Health. PD 12-137 (August 27, 2012). The obligation to file tax
returns is not suspended except in the limited circumstances provided by
§ 58.1-341F. When executor filed late returns for 2005 and claimed an
offset for 2006 and 2007, the offset was filed too late.

44.

Extensions/SOL. PD 12-84 (May 21, 2012). When a taxpayer fails to file
a return by the extended due date, the conditional terms of the extension
are breached. As a result, all statutes of limitations analyses are gauged
from the original due date of the return, not the ineffective extended date.

45.

Part Year Resident. PD 12-103 (June 19, 2012). Person who abandons
his Virginia domicile and moves to another state is a part year Virginia
resident. Standard deductions are prorated based on ratio of federal
adjusted gross income attributable to Virginia and personal exemptions are
prorated based on ratio on days of residence.
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IV.

RETAIL SALES & USE TAXES
A.

Legislation
1.

B.

Data Centers. Virginia Code § 58.1-609.3(18) now allows a data center
operator to aggregate tenant employment and investment to qualify tenants
for sales tax exemption.

Rulings of the State Tax Commissioner
Taxable Transactions & Measure
1.

LLCs. PD 12-131 (August 10, 2012). An LLC is a separate legal entity
for sales and use tax purposes. Even though the taxpayer agreed that the
holding company and its LLCs should be audited as a unit, the
Commissioner, at the taxpayer’s request, returns the audit to separately
calculate the tax on each LLC. Sign manufacturers are now taxed as
retailers. Posts to which signs are attached are part of the sale of the sign.

2.

Intercompany Transactions. PD 11-207 (December 29, 2011). Affiliate B
owned and depreciated property which was used by Affiliates C and D
which reimbursed Affiliate B based on time of use. Affiliate B should
purchase this property under a resale exemption certificate and charge its
affiliates sales tax based on the amount paid by them.

3.

Interstate Commerce. PD 12-123 (July 30, 2012). When a motor vehicle
is not required to be titled in Virginia, it is technically subject to the retail
sales and use tax unless an exception applies. In this case, the interstate
exemption applied because the Virginia seller utilized a freight broker
which arranged for delivery to the customer out of state. It was the broker,
not the seller, who arranged the delivery to the seller.

4.

Advertising Labor. PD 12-116 (July 19, 2012). Taxpayer designed and
sold advertising flyers which were printed and mailed at a facility in
Virginia. As an advertising business, the taxpayer is the user and
consumer of the printing which it purchases from its parent. It does not
charge tax on the sale of items to its customers. The charge for inserting
and mailing the printing is part of the sales price of the printing.

5.

POA Facilities. PD 12-82 (May 11, 2012). Fee charged to members of a
property owners association for use of facilities are not taxable provided
that no tangible personal property or services are provided in connection
with the use of those facilities.

6.

Greens Fees/Records. PD 12-67 (May 2, 2012). When accommodation
packages include meals, attractions and golf for a single lump sum price,
the entire charge is taxable. In this case, the seller had backup records
showing the exact charge in each package for the usually nontaxable
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greens fees. On this basis, and with the requirement that the seller collect
tax in the future, the assessment was waived. Penalty was imposed,
however, on meals taxes collected but remitted at a lower rate. This
included the amnesty penalty on top of the regular penalty.
7.

Equipment with Operator. PD 12-65 (April 30, 2012). When equipment
is rented with a skilled operator, the transaction is generally treated as a
service and not as a rental of tangible personal property. In this case,
amusement games were rented with an attendant, but that “operator” did
not have specific skills necessary to maintain safety and control over the
equipment during operation. Accordingly, it was a taxable lease.

8.

Compressed Air. PD 12-10 (February 27, 2012). Refilling Scuba tanks is
a taxable transaction and not a nontaxable service. The air is tangible
personal property. Whatever the charge is the taxable “sales price.”

9.

Repair/Replacement Program. PD 12-79 (May 9, 2012), PD 12-80 May 9,
2012). To be exempt from sales tax, repair services must be invoiced to
separately state charges for labor and parts. Program by which vendor
provided buyer with either replacement parts, repaired parts, etc. did not
qualify because there was no separate statement showing that property
owned by the taxpayer was repaired, with separate charges for parts and
labor, and returned immediately.

10.

Sign Fabricator. PD 12-70 (May 3, 2012). By specific legislation, the
sale of signs is now deemed to be the sale of tangible personal property
and not real estate construction. The taxable sales price includes any
services that are part of the sale. When the installer incurs permit fees and
other costs which it passes on to its customer, those fees are part of the
taxable “sales price.” If the buyer pays those fees directly, they are not
part of the taxable sales price.

11.

Park Trailers. PD 12-64 (April 30, 2012). As the provider of
accommodations, a taxpayer is the user and consumer of all tangible
personal property purchased and used in that business. This includes park
trailers rented to customers. Auditor assessed tax at only 60% of base
price, treating such trailers as modular buildings which they were not.
They were taxable at 100%. Because statute of limitations on making a
new assessment has expired, the Department will not assess additional tax
during the appeal.

12.

Software/Renewals. PD 12-6 (February 23, 2012). Software delivered in
any tangible form (e.g., CD or DVD), and any upgrades called for by the
original contract, are subject to sales and use taxation unless the software
meets the definition of “custom.” When an upgrade is so substantial that it
is separately negotiated from the original transaction, the taxability stands
on new facts. If the new transaction is independent of the original
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transaction (e.g., not called for by the original contract) and is separately
billed, it is not taxable if delivered by electronic means.
13.

Authentication Solutions. PD 12-2 (January 19, 2012). Taxpayer
provided authentication solutions for persons seeking to perform secure
electronic commerce over the Internet. All activities were conducted on
line. No tangible personal property was provided. Charges are not sales
and use taxable.

14.

Flooring Contractor. PD 12-127 (August 2, 2012). When taxpayer
purchased flooring repairs which required the contractor to glue new
flooring and remove existing tile and drywall, the activities fit exactly the
definition of a contractor with respect to real estate in the regulations.

15.

Lakes and Ponds. PD 11-195 (December 5, 2011). Taxation of company
which provides aeration and fountain equipment for lakes and ponds
depends upon whether the installations are with respect to real estate. If
they are, then the taxpayer is the user and consumer. If not, they are retail
sales. The provision of plants and fish in ponds is a sale of tangible
personal property.

16.

School Sales. PD 11-166 (September 27, 2011). Public school system
sells surplus equipment supplies. Even though an entity of the
Commonwealth, these sales are taxable. But if the sales occur on three or
fewer occasions each calendar year, the occasional sale exemption will
apply.

17.

Food/Facilities Management. PD 11-188 (November 28, 2011). Taxpayer
provided food preparation services for health care facilities. The health
care facility was the user and consumer of the food. Therefore, the
management fees were taxable at the general sales tax rate and not the
reduced rate applicable to food for home consumption. On the other hand,
if the facility maintained title to the food purchases, those items could be
purchased at the reduced rate.

18.

Food Management. PD 12-63 (April 30, 2012). Continuing care
retirement community hired management company to provide food service
to the CCRC’s residents. The prepared meals were never transferred to
the CCRC but, instead, were served directly to its residents. The CCRC is
engaged in a service business. The management company performs tasks
that the CCRC would otherwise would have to complete itself. Because
no tangible personal property was sold by the management company to the
CCRC, the management fees are not subject to tax.

19.

Food Management. PD 12-62 (April 30, 2012). As a companion to PD
12-63, the food service provider sought a ruling on the taxability of its
management services. Because no food or other tangible personal
property was actually transferred to the customer (only to the customer’s
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residents), there was no taxable sale of tangible personal property. Food
service manager properly paid tax on its purchases of food supplies and
did not charge tax on its management fees.
20.

Catered Meals. PD 12-58 (April 27, 2012). The Commissioner holds that
sales of catered meals to nonprofit organizations are taxable if the
nonprofit’s exemption applies only to tangible personal property.
“Because preparation services must be performed in order to provide
catered food, the sale of such constitutes a taxable service … .”
Comment. It is remarkable that the Department issued this ruling without
making a single citation to the Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision in
Chesapeake Hospital Authority v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 551 (2001).
That case rejected the Department’s attempts to impose use tax on coffee,
donuts and prepared meals provided by hospitals to doctors, nurses,
directors, and other persons who are not patients. The Supreme Court’s
analysis, without complaint by the Department, was that meals were
tangible personal property. To argue that something becomes a “taxable
service” because services are required in preparing the article, would
suggest that an automobile or any tangible good that is manufactured is a
taxable service because it requires significant services to create it. The
Department’s reliance on a series of rulings related to the sale of meals to
government entities for consumption by individuals is especially
questionable given the Supreme Court’s holding in Chesapeake Hospital
Authority, a government entity.

21.

Excise Tax. PD 12-90 (June 5, 2012). No resale exemption was allowed
for repair parts provided with respect to rental motor vehicles because the
taxpayer did not show that either the motor vehicle or retail sales tax had
been paid in connection with the leases of those vehicles. No sales tax had
been paid on the manufacturers’ excise tax with respect to tires. The
statutory exclusion for excise taxes applies only to retailers’ excise taxes.
Because taxpayer had not paid use taxes for the periods in question, an
additional assessment was issued in connection with the appeal.

Exemptions: Industrial
22.

Micro Brewing/Manufacturing. PD 12-125 (July 31, 2012). Sixty-seven
percent (67%) of a micro brewery’s production was sold to on-site beer
customers. Commissioner denies the direct use in manufacturing
exemption because predominant activity was making retail sales, not
manufacturing beer for sale.

23.

Packing Equipment. PD 12-119 (July 25, 2012). Wholesaler of
packaging products also operated machinery that converted corrugated
cardboard into self-locking boxes. Although this was potentially an
industrial processing activity, it was conducted by a wholesale merchant
business, the primary activity of which was not manufacturing. The direct
use exemption was not available.
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24.

Wood Products Harvester. PD 12-1 (January 12, 2012). Taxpayer
operated a mulch yard. It was also a real property contractor that removed
trees and vegetation from job sites and then shipped them into wood waste
and other materials. Commissioner holds that the industrial exemptions
are available only for operations at a single plant site and do not apply to
equipment that moves between locations. Accordingly, the chippers,
mulchers, etc. used outside the mulch yard were taxable. The forest
products exemption did not apply because the equipment was not
necessary to harvesting the trees.

25.

Manufacturing/Direct Use. PD 12-118 (July 23, 2012). Software
managed and monitored work in progress on the factory floor, providing
key information to support supply chain management and sales. This was
an administrative function and not qualified for the direct use exemption.
Similarly, a wireless gun system was utilized for internal tracking and
inventory control and not exempt. A maintenance contract for that
wireless gun system was also taxable, based on one-half of the charge.

26.

Manufacturing/Vending Machine. PD 11-168 (September 29, 2011).
Manufacturer used vending machine to dispense exempt safety equipment.
Held that the vending machine was not directly used in manufacturing and
was taxable.

27.

Direct Use Manufacturing. PD 12-52 (April 23, 2012). Floor scrubbers
used to vacuum and clean floors between production runs were not used
directly in manufacturing. They were not used as an immediate part of the
production process. They were not used during production. Racks used to
store both raw materials and finished goods were taxable to the extent
used for finished goods. The statute expressly provides an exemption for
the handling and storage of raw materials, but not for finished goods.
Forklifts previously held to be taxable, because used in a taxable
construction process, were held to be nontaxable during the audit because
used in an exempt activity then. The key was that the forklifts were under
a monthly lease, so the exemption applied for the periods in which the
preponderance of the use was exempt.

28.

Natural Gas Extraction/Direct Use. PD 12-73 (May 9, 2012). The
pollution control exemption for materials certified by the DMME ended
July 1, 2006. As to the taxpayer’s claim for exemption for tracer wire,
which was placed in underground pipes to enable them to be traced, and
stone used as backfill for those pipes, the Commissioner rules they are not
“indispensable to actual production” and therefore are not directly used
and exempt. Taxpayer also argued that stone used in providing access to
well site areas was exempt in greater proportion than had been allowed by
the auditor. Commissioner also holds that 100% of this stone is taxable
because not directly used. Observation. It appears that the
Commissioner reversed the auditor’s position which had allowed a partial
exemption, but did not increase the assessment by this amount. If the
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taxpayer had not taken an aggressive appeal on what constitutes “directly
used,” it would have had a precedent it could have relied on in future
audits for deducting at least a portion of the stone used in well site access.
29.

Shipping Pallets. PD 12-87 (May 24, 2012). Wooden pallets used to ship
goods are generally treated as taxable under the regulations. In this case,
however, the wholesaler purchased pallets with the express intent of
reselling them. When goods were packaged for sale using the pallets,
there was a separate charge to the customer for the pallet. The pallets
were not returnable and not reusable by the taxpayer. The Commissioner
allows the resale exemption for these pallets.

30.

Strapping Materials. PD 12-55 (April 25, 2012). A yarn manufacturer
utilized plastic and steel strapping materials in shipping products to
customers. Although the Commissioner declines to allow a packaging
exemption (bundling is not packaging), he does allow a resale exemption
because the strapping materials were essentially resold to the customer and
the manufacturer, which did not provide any transportation services, did
not make any taxable use of the strapping.

31.

Manufactured Homes. PD 12-19 (March 5, 2012). Whether “set up
components” of a manufactured home are subject to the 3% motor vehicle
sales tax or the 5% retail sales tax depends on whether the manufactured
home remains tangible personal property upon installation. If they are and
the cost of set up components are included in the sales price of the
manufactured home, they are subject to the 3% tax. If the manufactured
home is affixed to a permanent foundation and included in the sale of real
estate, the set up components are subject to the 5% retail sales and use tax.
The tax treatment of HVAC units depends on whether the manufactured
home is real estate at the time of attachment. If it is, then the contractor
making the installation is a real estate contractor and must pay the tax.

32.

Pollution Control. PD 11-172 (October 6, 2011). Without certification by
the DEQ, no pollution control exemption is available.

33.

Pollution Control. PD 12-96 (June 13, 2012). Taxpayer sought an
exemption for pollution control equipment which the DEQ would not
certify because it was used at multiple sites and therefore was “not a
permanent part of the job or actually fixed to the job.” Commissioner
holds that, without certification, there is no sales and use tax exemption.

Exemptions: General
34.

Charities. PD 12-130 (August 9, 2012). A person providing
entertainment services is engaged in a service business and is the user and
consumer of all tangible personal property used in providing those
services. Even though one of the contracts was for a nonprofit
organization (the “USO”), the nonprofit cannot transfer its tax exempt
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status to anyone else. Purchases by the service provider are still taxable
even though reimbursed by the USO.
35.

Package Air Carrier. PD 12-111 (July 9, 2012). Taxpayer is described as
equivalent of UPS or FedEx, utilizing both motor vehicles and air craft to
transport property. It is licensed by the FAA as an air carrier.
Commissioner holds that the exemption applicable to “airlines operating
in interstate or foreign commerce as a common carrier providing
scheduled air service on a continuing basis …” applies. Moreover, he
holds that the exemption will also apply to the motor vehicles and other
equipment that are used in connection with providing this common carrier
service.

36.

Prosthetic Devices. PD 12-95 (June 13, 2012). For a prosthetic device or
other durable medical equipment to be exempt when sold to a medical
practice or for profit hospital, the item must be specifically purchased for
one individual on a doctor’s written prescription. All purchases of
prosthetic devices are taxable. Vendors’ records must include the name of
the specific individual and the written prescription. Sales of durable
medical equipment to not for profit hospitals that have obtained exemption
letters are not taxable.

37.

Egg Production. PD 11-175 (October 13, 2011). Taxpayer washed,
graded and packaged eggs. Machine used to wash plastic egg trays that
carried eggs from the farm to the factory was used in general maintenance
and was not exempt. “Honey wagon” that took waste water from the egg
cleaning process and spread it on farm land was not used directly in
processing eggs. Although fans used to dry manure underneath the
chicken houses were not used directly in processing the eggs, the
agricultural exemption did apply.

38.

Data Centers. PD 11-183 (October 27, 2011). Virginia Code § 58.1-609.3
provides a sales tax exemption for purchases by certain data centers if
there is a $150 million investment and 50 jobs are created. This ruling
confirms that the jobs can be created by tenants of a data center and do not
have to be created by the entity owning the data center. Note 2012
legislation allowing data center owner to enter into one MOU with the
VEDP on behalf of itself and its tenants.

39.

Well Drilling Truck. PD 12-28 (March 19, 2012). Legislation now
codifies the Department’s policy of not imposing a retail sales and use tax
on the sale or lease of motor vehicles with a gross vehicle weight of
26,001 or more.

40.

Occasional Sale/Interest. PD 12-69 (May 3, 2012). Generator purchased
by taxpayer from its parent company qualifies for the occasional sale
exemption. Taxpayer’s request to abate interest because of excessive time
required for audit denied. Interest is a fee for the use of money. Delay
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was not deliberate. Much of delay was to accommodate taxpayer’s need
to provide documentation.
Audits & Procedure
41.

Corrected Mistakes. PD 12-129 (August 7, 2012). Taxpayer was not
excused from its duty to pay incorrectly calculated sales tax simply
because its customers failed to advise it of the tax collection errors. In
extrapolating sample information, the Commissioner holds that auditors
correctly included errors in the sample that were corrected subsequently.
The Commissioner will allow credit for the actual amount of tax in each
item, but will not change the sample. Observation. The Department
continues on this unfair path. If a mistake is corrected, there is no mistake
to be assessed. How can it be fair to include a nonexistent mistake in the
extrapolated sample?

42.

Sample Credits. PD 12-133 (August 20, 2012). Even though the
taxpayer’s detailed sample shows a substantially lower tax due,
Commissioner upholds the audit sample methodology because taxpayer
did not prove any of the sales taxed in the sampling process were
erroneously taxed. When taxpayer proved that its customers had paid use
tax on items included in the sample, Commissioner allows a credit for the
actual tax paid, but does not remove the erroneous transactions from the
sample.

43.

Unreported Sales. PD 12-35 (March 28, 2012). Taxpayer did not file
returns, including returns prepared by CPA, and did not remit taxes
collected from customers. Department estimated omitted taxes and
applied both fraud penalty and amnesty penalty.

44.

Exemption Certificates. PD 12-68 (May 3, 2012). When someone accepts
an exemption certificate, he must exercise reasonable care and judgment
to determine that the certificate covers the types of property being sold.
Accordingly, a manufacturing exemption certificate was not acceptable to
exempt envelopes and invoices; but envelopes, invoice forms, flash drives,
and gold pens reasonably could have been acquired by the customers in
question for resale. A separately stated charge for postage is exempt as
“transportation out.”

45.

Exemption Certificates. PD 11-206 (December 20, 2011). Because
taxpayer did not obtain exemption certificates before the audit and
contemporaneous with the sales, each sale transaction is reviewed without
any presumption in the taxpayer’s favor.

46.

Exemption Certificate. PD 12-71 (May 4, 2012). Exemption certificates
received after the date of a sales transaction are not accorded the
presumption of correctness. The Commissioner goes on, however, to state
that “The Code of Virginia very clearly provides that a dealer must charge
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and collect the Virginia sales and use tax from its customers on the sale of
tangible personal property, unless the Taxpayer takes from its customer a
valid exemption certificate. Without such exemption certificate, the
transaction at issue is subject to the sales tax.” Comment. This is not
what the statute says and not even what the regulations say. Both Virginia
Code § 58.1-623 and 23 VAC 10-210-280 state that transactions are
subject to tax until the contrary is established. Taking a valid exemption
certificate will relieve the taxpayer of the burden of proof, but even
without such an exemption certificate, the taxpayer can prove that a valid
resale has occurred.
47.

Truck Scales/Exemption Certificate. PD 12-98 (June 14, 2012). A resale
exemption certificate for an installed truck scale was rejected. The
certificate was signed three years after the sale, not contemporaneously
with the sale. Moreover, it is not credible to argue that a customer to
whom a scale with installation is being sold, intends to resell that real
estate improvement.

48.

Burden of Proof. PD 12-31 (March 23, 2012). Daycare center was
assessed use tax because it could not prove that it had paid the sales tax on
various purchases.

49.

Burden of Proof. PD 12-41 (April 12, 2012). Because taxpayer failed to
provide accounting records reconciling its sales tax reports with its sales,
auditor was justified in making an estimated assessment based on best
information available.

50.

Faulty Dealer Invoices. PD 12-57 (April 27, 2012). Although dealers
failed to separately state the tax on invoices, one dealer provided a
notarized statement to the effect that tax had been included in the purchase
price and remitted to the Tax Department. Nevertheless, the Department
holds that the contractor being audited cannot prove that he paid the sales
tax to his vendor. Comment. Given the notarized statement from the
vendor admitting that it charged and remitted the tax, this ruling seems
unusually harsh. The only explanation is the comment at the end of the
ruling that there was somehow other “required documentation necessary to
allow for an adjustment.”

51.

Penalties. PD 11-184 (November 8, 2011). Restaurant collected tax from
customers but failed to remit it to the Department, claiming that its failure
was due to hospital stay by the responsible employee. Penalty was not
waived.

52.

Manufacturing Direct Use/Penalties. PD 12-48 (April 23, 2012). No
exemption for packaging materials used by manufacturer was available
because taxpayer was not engaged in manufacturing. It simply applied
labels and hangers to otherwise finished goods. This was distribution, not
manufacturing. Observation. This ruling is a good example of the “first
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generation audit” rule for waiving penalties. Because the wooden pallets
in issue had not been taxed in previous audits, they were a new issue in
this audit. The calculation of penalties was redone to take into account
this first generation audit issue.
53.

Interest. PD 12-81 (May 11, 2012). Taxpayer’s previous appeal and
attempt to settle sales tax audit had been rejected. On petition for
rehearing, taxpayer finally provides documentation to substantiate audit
adjustments. Taxpayer’s request for an abatement of interest and penalties
is denied. Interest is a charge for the use of money. Abatement of
penalties depends on meeting the standards set forth in the regulations.

54.

Unremitted Tax. PD 12-102 (June 19, 2012). Taxpayer incorrectly
charged 5% on sales of donuts, coffee and other food that qualified for the
reduced rate on for food home consumption. It remitted only 2.5%.
Although it remitted all the law required, it is nevertheless required to
remit all that it collects. Penalties, including amnesty penalties, not
waived.

55.

Refunds. PD 11-176 (October 21, 2011). Taxpayer mistakenly charged
tax based on the list price and not the discounted price. Taxes payable on
the actual price charged the customer. Refunds are available if the
taxpayer can show it is refunded to its customers the erroneous
overpayments.

56.

Officer Liability. PD 12-49 (April 23, 2012). Commissioner concludes
that only a person who is an officer or employee of the corporation can be
held liable for unpaid taxes. Accordingly, a 50% owner who is not an
officer or employee was not liable. A 25% owner who served as Secretary
but had retired from active involvement in corporate affairs, writing no
checks or make any business decisions, likewise was not liable for the tax.

57.

Office Liability. PD 12-50 (April 23, 2012). Crying before he was hurt,
taxpayer filed administrative appeal before any unpaid taxes were assessed
against him. Commissioner treats his “appeal” as a request for ruling but
declines to rule because there was no proof as to the taxpayer’s actual
duties with the corporation, no proof of his knowledge about unpaid tax
liability; and no proof about his check signing authority.

58.

Officer Liability. PD 12-51 (April 23, 2012). Another officer of the
company noted his appeal before receiving an assessment, and again the
Commissioner treats it as a ruling request. Here, the taxpayer was an
officer, was aware of the unpaid taxes, had the authority to prevent the tax
payment failure, and may have failed to pay over the taxes once they were
known. Nevertheless, the taxpayer was not responsible for the taxes
because he did not have the specific corporate duty of timely reporting and
paying the tax.
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59.

Responsible Officer. PD 11-163 (September 26, 2011). President of
corporation was not the “responsible officer” who failed to report and pay
taxes. Those duties were the responsibility of the CFO. Because the
President lacked knowledge of the corporation’s failure to report and pay
use taxes, the personal assessment against the President was abated.

60.

Responsible Officer. PD 11-164 (September 27, 2011). Unpaid corporate
taxes were “converted” to this individual because her social security
number appeared on several tax returns of the company. Based on an
affidavit provided by the taxpayer that she was never an officer,
shareholder, director or even employee of the company, the converted
assessment was abated.

61.

Officer Liability. PD 12-100 (June 15, 2012). Although President of the
corporation and a 20% stockholder, taxpayer’s duty focused on overseeing
and performing tire sales, installation, repair and servicing. Financial
matters were handled by another officer. When President learned that
taxes had not been paid, he guaranteed a loan and was told that they had
been paid. President is not personally responsible for the corporation’s
unpaid taxes. He did not have the specific duty of reporting and paying
taxes and lacked actual knowledge that they had not been paid.

62.

Unremitted Tax PD 12-74 (May 9, 2012). Taxpayer collected tax on the
full amount for installation of floor coverings, but did not remit the tax
attributable to installation labor which had not been separately stated on
invoices. Taxpayer must remit all taxes collected from customers,
whether properly collected or not.

63.

Communication Services/Effective Date. PD 11-204 and PD 11-205
(December 20, 2011). Even though the legislation became effective
January 1, 2007, it is applied to transactions before that date if reflected in
a bill issued after the effective date.

64.

Communications Tax Refunds. PD 12-43 (April 16, 2012). As an
instrumentality of the Commonwealth, the Town was not subject to the
communications sales tax. This is so even though it had not yet filed
exemption certificates with the telephone company. Once those
certificates are filed, it is entitled to a refund from the communications
service provider for up to two years. Comment. Note that this is a tax
administered by the Department of Taxation. Although the provisions
allowing for a refund from the telecommunications service provider are
limited to two years, is there any reason that a three year refund is not
available from the Department of Taxation under Virginia Code § 58.11823?

65.

Late Appeal. PD 12-54 (April 24, 2012). The appeal was not timely filed
because not filed within 90 days. Moreover, because the original
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assessment was not paid within 30 days of its issuance, a 20% amnesty
penalty was applied.

V.

66.

Faxed Appeals. PD 12-97 (June 13, 2012). When an appeal is filed by
fax, it must be dated and received on or before the ninetieth calendar day
after the date of assessment. This appeal was neither transmitted nor
received within the ninety days.

67.

Statute of Limitations. PD 11-208 (December 30, 2011). The Department
strictly enforce the 90 day limitations for filing a complete appeal.

68.

Ice Cream/Liens. PD 12-9 (February 27, 2012). An ice cream shop that
sells for immediate consumption is not entitled to charge the reduced food
tax rate for “home consumption.” Department properly put a lien on the
taxpayer’s accounts when its bill rendered 30 days after the assessment
was not paid. This was so even though a timely appeal was filed
thereafter. Comment. To avoid this problem with liens and other
collection actions, be sure to file a Notice of Intent to Appeal with the
Department within 30 days of the date of assessment. This will generally
forestall collection efforts until the appeal is completed, assuming that a
timely appeal is filed within 90 days of the date of assessment.

BUSINESS LICENSE TAX
A.

Cases
1.

Ford Motor Credit Company v. Chesterfield County, 281 Va. 321 (2011).
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the holding of the Circuit Court
that allowed Chesterfield County to tax 100% of the interest earned on
loans “originated” in the regional office located in that County. The loans
were documented at dealerships, forwarded to the regional office for
review in a three-day process, and then sent to offices in Tennessee and
Maryland where all continuing relationships with customers, including
billing and collection, were handled during the multiyear lives of the
loans. The activities of the Chesterfield office were subject to the
supervision and direction of the Michigan headquarters which also
produced all of the funds that were loaned to customers. Under these
facts, the Supreme Court held that it could not reasonably be said that all
the income generating activities of this business occurred in Chesterfield
County. The Supreme Court further held that because of the nature of
Ford Credit’s business, it was appropriate to use payroll apportionment to
determine the revenues taxable by Chesterfield County. The Supreme
Court rejected the County’s argument that because an internal accounting
report, based on contract accounting, showed exactly the revenues
attributable to loans originated in the County, that apportionment and
other situs rules were inappropriate. As the Supreme Court noted, the
statutes require situs rules based on where services are rendered, and a
contract driven accounting system does not do that. Finally, the Supreme
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Court held that Ford Credit is also entitled to deduct from its taxable base
receipts attributable to business in other states, under Virginia Code
§ 58.1-3732B(2).
B.

C.

Attorney General’s Opinions
1.

Military Bases. 2012 Va. AG Lexis 9 (February 24, 2012). Although the
United States has exclusive jurisdiction over the Little Creek Naval Base,
the Buck Act permits the imposition of gross receipts taxes and therefore a
BPOL tax. Whether the contractor’s construction trailer satisfies the
definite place of business requirement is a factual question on which the
Attorney General will not opine.

2.

Severance Tax. 10 OAG 110 (August 5, 2011). Persons engaged in
severing gases from the earth who do not do so in connection with coal
mining may take deductions for expenses incurred after the gas was used
or sold for use within the taxing locality or after it is placed in transit for
shipment from the taxing locality. The tax is based on gross receipts,
defined as “the fair market value measured at the time such coal or gases
are utilized or sold for utilization…or at the time they are placed in transit
for shipment [from the locality].” Va. Code § 58.1-3712. Although the
term gross receipts generally does not contemplate deductions, the statute
nevertheless permits them, except if the taxpayer engages in the
production and operation of severing cases from the earth in connection
with coal mining.

Rulings of the State Tax Commissioner
Exclusions, Exemptions and Reductions
1.

Severance Tax. PD 12-44 (April 18, 2012). When natural gas is placed in
transit at a wellhead in the County, gross receipts for local severance tax
purposes do not include value added after that time. This would allow a
deduction, for example, for transportation, compression and other costs
incurred after transportation begins.

2.

Place of Business. PD 11-161 (September 20, 2011). Out-of-state
company had employees permanently located at a client’s offices in
Virginia providing “infrastructure support and maintenance services.”
The company did not advertise this as an office. Nevertheless, the
Commissioner holds that it is a definite place of business and subject to
local license taxation.

3.

Place of Business. PD 11-192 (November 28, 2011). Taxpayer had
approximately 200 - 500 employees assigned to work on a continuing
basis at a military installation. Workspace for the exclusive use of the
taxpayer was provided by the military. This constituted a definite place of
business, and the gross receipts attributable to the services provided at that
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military installation were taxable in that locality. Second locality where
the taxpayer’s home office was located could not tax those receipts.
4.

Parent Subsidiary. PD 11-167 (September 28, 2011). Virginia locality
tried to assess tax against foreign parent based on payments it made to
Virginia subsidiary which provided marketing, procurement and other
business services for it. Commissioner holds that locality cannot pierce
the corporate veil in this fashion. Only the local subsidiary is taxable
(minimum fee only) because intercompany receipts are not taxable.

5.

Rental Business. PD 11-187 (November 23, 2011). Taxpayer provided
furnished housing to employees of its clients, all utilities included. This is
deemed to be the business of renting real estate which is taxable in some
Virginia localities. The rental property itself is considered to be a definite
place of business. Note. That the Commissioner holds that the
prohibition against the imposition of BPOL taxes on real estate applies
only when the lessor is the owner of the property.

6.

Pollution Control. PD 12-24 (March 12, 2012). The exemption for
pollution control facilities provided by Virginia Code § 58.1-3660 applies
only to property taxes, not BPOL taxes. Comment. Why does the
Commissioner engage in analysis about rules of construction and strictly
construing exemptions? The statute is clear.

7.

Affiliated Group. PD 12-34 (March 26, 2012). S corporation provided
services to group of related entities ultimately controlled by the same
stockholders, three trusts. The services were provided to limited
partnerships of which the S corporation was a general partner. On the
specific facts presented, the Commissioner holds that the intercompany
transactions between the taxpayer and the first tier and second tier limited
partnerships were not exempt from BPOL taxation.

8.

Out of State Deduction/Apportionment. PD 12-146 (August 31, 2012).
Following the lead of Arlington and Hampton, this locality declined to
allow the taxpayer to take a 58.1-3732B2 deduction arguing that payroll
apportionment already provided an adequate deduction for out of state
receipts. The State Tax Commissioner, following previous rulings, states
that the out of state deduction must be determined using payroll
apportionment. Query. The state ruling orders the locality to make a new
assessment utilizing payroll apportionment to determine the out of state
deduction. Will the locality do that? Arlington and Hampton did not.

9.

Interstate Deduction. PD 12-88 & 12-89 (May 31, 2012). This is the third
time that the State Tax Commissioner has had to consider these same
appeals from the same two localities. In response to a convoluted
argument about how to compute the interstate deduction, the
Commissioner provides a very specific three step process:

-26-

1.
Do local employees in Virginia participate in interstate
transactions?
2.
Can specific receipts be traced to this local participation? If so,
deduct those receipts. If specific linkage is not possible because payroll
apportionment was used to determine taxable receipts, then
3.
Apply the same payroll factor to determine the deductible portion
of gross receipts attributable to states in which the taxpayer filed an
income tax return.
10.

Agency. PD 12-77 (May 9, 2012). Country club held taxable with respect
to amounts collected from members that were passed on in payment of
separately incorporated pro shops, as dues to independent golf
organizations, and as a voluntary bonus pool for employees.
Commissioner holds that taxpayer failed to prove the three elements
necessary to establish that these receipts were held in an agency capacity:
(i) contract with third party, (ii) noncommingling of funds, and (iii) not
reported on federal income tax return. Comment. Part of the problem in
this appeal is that the taxpayer did not cooperate with requests by the
Department of Taxation for additional information. Beyond that, bear in
mind that only those gross receipts attributable to the exercise of a
licensed privilege and derived in the ordinary course of business are
subject to gross receipts taxation. See Va. Code § 58.1-3732A.

Classification
11.

Manufacturing/Wholesaling. PD 12-4 (February 3, 2012). Manufacturer
purchased chemicals from affiliates and sold them through a warehouse
located at its manufacturing site. Department holds that manufacturer is
liable for a BPOL tax based on chemicals not manufactured on site. That
wholesaling business is not ancillary to the manufacturing business.

12.

Manufacturing. PD 12-66 (May 30, 2012). Locality taxes company as a
“business service” apparently without considering the total activities of the
business. Commissioner holds that when a company has multiple
facilities that constitute a single business, all of them must be considered
together to determine whether the taxpayer is a manufacturer and taxable
as such. In this case, the printer was a manufacturer and not subject to
BPOL taxation on gross receipts from the sale of goods at the place of
manufacturer.
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VI.

PROPERTY TAXES
A.

Legislation
1.

B.

C.

Transit Companies. Virginia Code § 58.1-609.1 17 exempts tangible
personal property sold or used by a transit company that is operated or
controlled by a county, city or town.

Court Decisions
1.

City of Richmond v. SunTrust Bank, 283 Va. 439 (March 2, 2012).
Richmond Redevelopment Housing Authority and SunTrust owned certain
property as tenants in common. Under an operating agreement, SunTrust
had exclusive use of the property. Supreme Court holds that City has no
authority to impose a property tax on SunTrust with respect to the portion
of the property owned by the RRHA, a state political entity. SunTrust’s
right to possession was grounded in the law relating to a tenancy in
common, not a lease. (City’s argument that the operating agreement was
tantamount to a lease was barred because trial court’s finding to the
contrary was not assigned as error.)

2.

Army-Navy Country Club v. City of Fairfax, Cir. Ct. Fairfax County, 2012
Va. Cir. LEXIS 21 (February 17, 2012). Based on long Virginia
precedent, trial court holds that City’s use of the “development cost” was
an inappropriate valuation method. It then considered the valuation
opinions of the two experts and concluded that the taxpayer’s expert was
more credible.

3.

City of Richmond v. Jackson Ward Partners, 284 Va. 8 (June 7, 2012). In
a 5 - 2 decision, the Supreme Court holds that the taxpayer failed to carry
its burden of proof, as a matter of law, because its expert appraiser failed
to value each of 8 separate parcels separately. Rather, the appraiser valued
the low income housing project as a whole, determined that fair market
value, and allocated it amount the 8 separate parcels/units mathematically.

4.

NA Properties, Inc. v. Loudoun County, Cir. Ct. Loudoun County, 2012
Va. Cir. Lexis 58 (July 3, 2012). Trial court finds that taxpayer’s
appraiser failed to prove that County’s assessment was erroneous. It was
not proper for appraiser to speculate on what could be done to property to
make it more valuable. Moreover, the appraiser utilized a development
density analysis that was based solely on his opinion without any
substantiation.

Rulings of State Tax Commissioner
1.

M&T/Pollution Control. PD 11-110 (June 17, 2011). Equipment used to
remove fumes and particulates during the manufacturing process was
possibly M&T if it helped provide power to the manufacturing process. A
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fines bin that collected wood material and returned it to the manufacturing
process was held to be M&T.
Taxpayer complained that locality was double taxing when it treated
capitalized costs relating to repair and replacement of machine parts as
taxable. Commissioner holds that the issue is the fair market value of the
machinery in question. Locality cannot simply add cost unless that new
cost, when added to the original cost, can be shown to reflect true fair
market value.
Locality must pay interest on refunds at the same rate it charges interest on
delinquencies.
2.

M&T/Valuation. PD 12-27 (March 16, 2012) When locality values based
on original cost, that is the cost paid by the original purchaser of the
property. Case returned to locality to consider new appraisal provided by
taxpayer. Comment. Commissioner makes the contradictory statement
that locality must assess at fair market value, but cannot consider
technological obsolescence in valuing machinery and tools.

3.

Computer Valuation. PD 12-145 (August 30, 2012). Locality valued
computers and peripherals utilizing a percentage of original cost.
Taxpayer supplied an appraisal. State Tax Commissioner remands the
case to the locality with instructions to consider the taxpayer’s appraisal.
Observation. Note the Department of Taxation’s great reluctance to
express any view as to the validity of a taxpayer’s appraisal, thereby
giving the locality broad discretion to refuse to follow it based on nitpicking analysis.

4.

Premature Appeal. PD 12-144 (August 30, 2012). Taxpayer was faced
with a jeopardy assessment when it failed to file a property tax return.
When it appealed to the Commissioner of Revenue who requested
additional information, the taxpayer then appealed to the State. The State
Tax Commissioner holds that he has no authority to hear the appeal
because there has been no “final local determination.” Observation. On
the facts of this case, this is probably a correct result. Note, however, how
injecting these sorts of technicalities into the administrative appeal process
provides opportunities for localities to “game the system.”

5.

Jurisdiction/Court Proceeding. PD 11-200 (December 12, 2011). When
taxpayer appeals its assessments both to the State Tax Commissioner and
the Circuit Court, the Department’s policy is to defer to the Circuit Court.
Observation. Sometimes it is necessary to file a protective claim with the
court while the administrative process proceeds. If this is done, consider
not serving the court’s suit immediately in an effort to let the
administrative process proceed uninterrupted. If the court filing is
discovered, it may be possible to convince the Department to rule anyway
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on the theory that the filing is simply a precaution and the court has not
actually taken the case up.

VII.

6.

Railroad/Operating Property. PD 11-201 (December 12, 2011). Based on
the fact that rail line was not in use and parts of its had been paved over,
staff treated the property as non-operating for local tax purposes. The
Commissioner reversed this. Under the rules of the Surface
Transportation Board, property remains as operating property until it is
permanently withdrawn from service. Taxpayer had retained a right to
utilize the line and its withdrawal from service was not authorized by the
STB.

7.

Vehicle Valuation. PD 11-198 (December 7, 2011). Taxpayer contested
locality’s use of NADA value for recreational vehicle instead of arms’
length sales price. Department declines to rule because the local mobile
property tax is not a “local business tax” over which the Department has
appellate jurisdiction.

8.

Rehearing. PD 12-143 (August 29, 2012). Taxpayer requested rehearing
on the basis that the Department has misstated the facts in its original
opinion. Commissioner holds that any misstatement of facts was the fault
of the taxpayer. Although this suggests that the Department will not grant
a rehearing when this occurs, the Commissioner goes on to rule on the
merits that the taxpayer has not proved that the locality’s method for
valuing taxi cabs is illegal.

9.

Interstate Trucker. PD 11-200 (December 12, 2011). Interstate trucking
company wanted to limit property taxation by locality to those trucks
shown by GPS tracking to have been present on January 1. Department
rules that locality can tax vehicles that are “normally garaged” in locality.
GPS data showed that trucks were often in the locality. Taxpayer failed to
carry burden to prove locality’s factual determination wrong.

10.

Taxi Cabs. PD 12-60 (April 27, 2012). Although taxi cabs are treated as a
separate classification of property for valuation purposes in the Code, the
City valued the taxpayer’s fleet using a recognized pricing guide. The
burden of proof is on the taxpayer to show that the City’s valuation is
wrong. The fact that other localities value taxi cabs differently does not
suffice. Case returned to locality to provide taxpayer with an opportunity
to provide detailed information concerning the condition of its vehicles.

MISCELLANEOUS TAX
A.

Legislation
1.

Consumer Utility Tax. Virginia Code § 58.1-3814 is amended to make
clear that localities cannot tax natural gas used by electric utilities and
coops to generate electricity for sale.
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B.

2.

Roll Your Own. Virginia Code § 58.1-1003.3 now classifies a retailer
who has machines that enable customers to “roll their own” as a cigarette
manufacturer, with those cigarettes being subject to tax.

3.

Defense Contractors. Virginia Code § 58.1-3245.12 is amended to allow
local government to establish a defense production and support services
zone and provide regulatory flexibility and certain incentives in that zone.

Rulings of the State Tax Commissioner
1.

Port Volume Increase Tax Credit Guidelines. PD 12-21 (March 5, 2012).
This document sets for the Department’s interpretation of the income tax
credit allowed for taxpayers engaged in manufacturing or distributing
manufactured goods through Virginia port facilities.

2.

Litter Tax. PD 12-13 (March 2, 2012). Taxpayer owns and rents
residential property. This is not one of the businesses that is required to
pay a litter tax.

3.

Tobacco/Bidis. PD 12-18 (March 5, 2012). A penalty of 500% of the
retail value was imposed on wholesaler for selling contraband cigarettes
known as “bidis.” Department is charged by statute with administering
the cigarette tax and has full authority to impose such penalties.

4.

Bank Franchise Tax. PD 11-182 (November 30, 2011). Tax Department
acquiesces in the circuit court opinion AMG National Trust Bank v.
Commonwealth, Cir. Ct. Norfolk Docket No. CL 10-3031 (July 2011).
Accordingly, national bank with a mortgage loan office operated in
Virginia is subject to the bank franchise tax and not the corporate net
income tax. Because bank has no deposits in Virginia, the Department
will use an alternative apportionment method involving a single property
factor.

5.

Recordation Tax/Refinancing. PD 11-160 (September 19, 2011). To be
exempt as a refinancing of the “existing debt with the same lender,”
Department requires that taxpayer refinance his debt with the mortgage
lender that holds the deed of trust at the time of the refinancing. In this
case, the original lender had assigned its interest in the mortgage to a
bank. Accordingly, that original lender was not the “same lender” for a
refinancing.

6.

Recordation Tax/Value. PD 12-22 (March 9, 2012). Clerk assessed
recordation tax based on local assessed value, not consideration paid.
Commissioner holds that tax base is a factual determination best made by
the local clerk. While assessed value is one factor, it is not the only basis
for determining fair market value. Case returned to local clerk for further
consideration.
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VIII.

7.

Recordation Tax/Value. PD 11-191 (November 30, 2011). Determination
of fair market value of property for purposes of the recordation tax is a
factual matter. The Clerk is entitled to use the assessed value, but also can
take into consideration appraisals and other factual information.

8.

Recordation/Value. PD 11-173 (October 6, 2011). Determination of basis
on which to assess recordation tax is a factual issue, and the determination
of fair market value is a decision best made by the Clerk taking into
account all the facts and circumstances. The use of the assessed value is
presumptively correct, but an arms’ length purchase by the recording party
is also information to be considered.

9.

Recordation Tax. PD 12-61 (April 27, 2012). Determination of fair
market value on which recordation tax is assessed is a factual matter for
the clerk of court. The value as assessed for real estate tax purposes is
presumed accurate. Evidence that the taxpayer actually paid less for the
property should also be considered.

10.

Recordation Tax/LLC Transfer. PD 11-186 (November 16, 2011). Corp
A and Corp B contributed assets to a new LLC. As part of the transaction,
Corp B contributed real estate to the LLC and received a 42% interest in
return. The Commissioner rules that this transfer is not exempt from
recordation tax. (i) It is not a merger or consolidation which require that
at least one of the entities cease to exist after the transaction. Neither
corporation ceased to exist. (ii) It is not a reorganization because the
taxpayer was an LLC, not a corporation. (iii) The transaction is not
exempt, under the rule of strict construction, as the contribution of
property to a partnership. This was an LLC. (iv) Finally, the exemption
for contributions when grantors received at least 50% of the interest in the
LLC does not apply because the grantor here retained only a 42% interest.
The Commissioner acknowledges, however, that some tax refund may be
due on account of over-valuation or on the theory that the transferring
Corp B only transferred half of the property.

11.

Recordation Tax/Refinancing. PD 11-194 (December 2, 2011). On a
petition for rehearing, the decision in PD 11-19 is reaffirmed.

TRENDS
Addback Litigation. The Virginia Department of Taxation’s interpretation of the
addback legislation enacted in 2004 has been controversial, to say the least. Cases are
now queuing up for litigation. The Department has already lost in the trial court the
first case dealing with the safe harbor for entities that have more than one-third of
their revenues from unrelated parties and deal with related parties on the same basis.
As reported above, the trial court agreed with Wendy’s International that the statute is
plain and unambiguous. Anticipate that there will be a trial in the next twelve months
of the safe harbor for royalties that are taxable in another state. As with the related
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party safe harbor, the taxpayer’s position is that the “subject to tax in another state”
safe harbor is unambiguous and not subject to the distorted interpretation made by the
Department of Taxation.
Single Sales Factor. Virginia’s movement to single sales factor apportionment is
slow but steady. SSF was adopted by the 2012 legislature for retailers, and the
optional version of SSF for manufacturers was substantially amended to omit penalty
provisions for manufacturers who fail to maintain certain employment levels. The
Department of Taxation has issued draft Guidelines explaining its view of the new
statute. The key issue to be resolved in final Guidelines is how to count “average
employment” during the three years after the election is made. If average
employment drops below 90% of the base year, the SSF election is revoked and tax
benefits recaptured with interest.
Regulations. The Department of Taxation is apparently moving forward with its new
policy of avoiding the issuance of regulations whenever possible. Because the
procedure for adopting regulations was asserted to be too cumbersome, the
Department will rely on a variety of published documents to set forth its new policies.
These will include comprehensive “guideline” on a subject, “Policy Statements” as
well as continued reliance on published rulings and appeals. Taxpayers will no
longer be able to look just to regulations to determine the Department of Taxation’s
policy on any issue, and published regulations may no longer be valid in the
Department’s eyes. When asked the degree to which taxpayers can rely on such
policy statements not published as a regulation, the Department has informally replied
that for purposes of taxpayer reliance, the Department will provide the same
protection as it does for taxpayers who rely on regulations. It is a curious anomaly
when an informal Guideline or ruling purports to revoke a regulation.
Delayed Appeals. The Department of Taxation is running very late in handling
appeals and rulings. Some appeals have been pending for over two years. Part of the
problem is that record numbers of appeals and ruling requests are being filed, and the
Department’s staffing is down by almost 20%. The Department’s Assistant
Commissioner of Policy, however, indicates that the number of cases resolved
annually has risen not fallen. This likely reflects that the Department is trying to
resolve cases by settlements and other means that are not reflected in published
numbers of the slower appeals process. Practice tip: In this environment, it is
important that taxpayers develop careful factual records during the audit and argue
those complete records carefully in the administrative appeal. Taxpayers who rely on
supplementing the record later can find themselves in the position of requesting a
rehearing, or worse.. Practice tip #2: Note in the attached chart the circadian rhythm
of the Department’s rulings. This reflects that during the first three months of the
year, the Department’s Policy staff is tied up with the General Assembly and is less
able to focus on other policy issues. Do not plan on receiving any attention to your
appeals or policy requests from roughly December through March.
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